Mongol military tactics and organization
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
The Mongol military machine was largely the creation of one man- Genghis Khan. His system of warfare was responsible for the incredible success he and his heirs had in overrunning nearly all of Asia, the Middle East and much of Europe. In many ways, the Mongols created the first "modern" military system, and were rarely defeated for the first 80 years of their reign as the superpower of the medevial world.
The Mongols were one of the most feared forces ever to take the field of battle. Operating in massive sweeps, extending over dozens of miles, the fierce horsemen combined a shock, mobility and firepower unmatched in land warfare until well into the gunpowder age. Other peoples such as the Romans had stronger infantry, while others such as the Byzantines deployed more heavily armored cavalry. Still others, such as the Chinese and Europeans, were experts in fortifications, but none combined combat power on land with such devastating range, speed, scope and effectiveness as the Mongols.
Their military success was due to a number of factors;
- The organization of their armies.
- A command structure based on meritocracy.
- Superior training.
- Logistics.
- Intelligence services.
- Communications at both the strategic and battlefield levels
- Weaponry.
- Mobility.
- Ruthlessness.
- Tactics.
| The Mongol Invasions |
|---|
| Central Asia – Georgia and Armenia – Kalka River – Volga Bulgaria – Ryazan – Vladimir-Suzdal – Sit River – Köse Dag – Legnica – Mohi – Baghdad – Ain Jalut – Korea – Japan – Xiangyang – Bun'ei – Ngasaunggyan – Yamen – Kōan – Pagan – Syria – Kulikovo – Vorskla – Ugra River |
|
[edit] Organization
The Mongols had a simple yet surprisingly modern decimal scheme of organization, with the smallest unit comprising 10 troopers (arban), then 100 (jagun or yaghun), 1000 (minghan), then 10,000 (tumen or touman), commanded by a noyan. From two to five Tumens would then form a hordu meaning army corps or field army, from which the word "Horde" is derived, under the command of the Khans or their generals (boyan). These corresponded quite closely to the squads, companies, regiments, divisions and corps, of modern armies. Six of every ten Mongol troopers were light cavalry horse archers, the remaining four were more heavily armored and armed lancers. Operating with the smallest tactical unit in this organization simply had no peers for centuries to come, but was soon suggested in European military treatises of the time. Armies of the day were organized in "battles" in the west, knights, supported by infantry and light cavalry, and in rare cases levies of peasants. It would not be until the armies of the French Revolutionary Army and La Grande Armée of Napoleon, that Europe would devise a system of military organization as efficient and sophisticated as that of the Great Khan. In China and the Middle East tactical organization was more sophisticated — but still a poor match for the Mongol efficiency.
[edit] Command
Promotions were granted on the basis of ability, not birth, (with the possible exception of Genghis Khan's relatives who were given the highest levels of command). Subutai is the best example of this. In the Russian and East European campaigns, nominal command went to Batu Khan, the grandson of Genghis. Two other princes of the Blood commanded wings of that army. But all three Princes were under the operational control of Subutai, the son of a blacksmith, who was 65 years old at the time, and in his later life so fat he had to be hauled to battle in a cart! Upon receiving word of the death of Ogatai (son and successor of the Great Khan himself) in 1243, it was Subutai who reluctantly reminded his three princes of their dynastic duties and ordered the Tumens to ride back home, sparing Europe from further devastation. The Mongol command system was thus a meritocracy, which again, contrasted with the aristocratic systems of their foes.
[edit] Training
Most European armies consisted of a few professional men at arms, and Knights, and large levies of peasants or militia. Only the Knights and the few professional fighting men trained regularly, and their training emphasized individual combat, such as jousting, rather than group combat tactics. The Mongol armies, by contast, constantly practiced horsemanship, archery, and unit tactics, formations and rotations. This hard training was maintained by a hard, but not overly harsh or unreasonable, discipline.
Maneuver, diversion, firepower, shock and combined arms were emphasized at all levels of command. Officers and troopers alike were usually given a wide leeway by their superiors in carrying out their orders, so long as the larger objectives of the plan were well served and the orders promptly obeyed. The Mongols thus avoided the pitfalls of overly rigid discipline and micromanagement which have proven a hobgoblin to armed forces throughout history.
One unique training method that the Mongols used was huge hunts organized annually on the steppe. The Mongol horsemen would make a great circle, and drive all manner of animals in towards the center. Practicing the dynamic manoeuvres that would also be used on a battlefield, the Mongols would trap all the animals of various types in their encirclement, and on the order of their commander, begin the slaughter. This was an excellent way for the Mongols to train, and enjoy the recreation of hunting, as well as gather huge amounts of food for massive feasts.
[edit] Supply
The Mongol armies traveled very light, and were able to live largely off the land. Their equipment included fish hooks and other equipment meant to make each warrior independent of any fixed supply source. The most common travel food of the Mongols was dried and ground meat "Borts", which is common in the Mongolian cuisine until today. Borts is light and easy to transport, and can be cooked with water similarly to a modern "instant soup".
To ensure they would always have fresh horses, each trooper had five spare mounts. And since most of the Mongols' mounts were mares, they could live off their horses' milk or milk products when need arose. Wagons and carts carried large stockpiles of arrows, which were then put on the backs of camels (the Mongols' favorite beasts of burden after the horse) who would travel along with the spare mounts. So a Mongol trooper was rarely for want of munitions, a fresh horse or fresh milk. The main logistical factor limiting the Hordus' advance, was finding enough feed and water for their animals.
[edit] Intelligence services
Their incredible intelligence organization combined with centralized command to demonstrate remarkable ability to coordinate armies separated by great distances. In addition, their spies were among the world's best. They carefully scouted and spied out their enemies in advance of any invasion. For instance, prior to the invasion of Europe, Batu and Subutai sent spies for almost ten years into the heart of Europe, making maps of the old Roman roads, establishing trade routes, and determining the level of ability of each principality to resist invasion. They made well educated guesses as to the willingness of each principality to aid the others, and the level of ability of each to resist alone, and in toto.
[edit] Communication
Long before the United States existed, the Mongols started the first Pony Express. Their mail service was the first empire wide such service since the Roman Empire. Not only did they have long distance empire wide communication, they had superb battlefield tactical communication -- their use of flags to communicate movement orders during combat was unmatched until the advent of radio 700 years later.
[edit] Weapons
The reflex bows used by the Mongols were among the best of the age. Plate armor could be penetrated at close range, using special heavy arrows. Hitting targets up to 300 yards was possible, almost 50-100 yards more than the legendary English longbowmen. The Mongols used composite reflex bows on horseback and longbows while on the ground. (Their longbows could not be accurately fired on horseback, contrary to popular perception). They used a wide variety of arrows, depending on the target. Their laminated armor was lighter and the use of silk interweaves made it better quality than the heavy metal armor enemy soldiers wore. Their horses were unmatched in the world for endurance and training. In short, their weapons were as advanced, and often more advanced, than their opponents.
[edit] Mobility
They showed mobility unheard of by armies of the time--up to 100 miles/day. In point of fact, Mongol combination of mobility and communication was probably not equaled again until World War II. Their ability to live off the land, combined with their ability to move so swiftly made smaller armies far more lethal than larger ones fixed to lines of supply, and without the extra mounts each Mongol horseman routinely had with him.
[edit] Ruthlessness and Practicality
They were extremely ruthless in battle. They used terror as a weapon in a way not done again until Timur. They knew that fixed populations were not free to flee danger, as nomad populations were, and knew also that destruction of their cities was the worst a fixed population could expect. They made use of that fear by destroying a few cities, then usually having the remainder quickly surrender to avoid the same fate. The reputation for terror was so great that the legendary Hashashin cult literally laid down their arms and surrendered their impregnable fortresses without a struggle to avoid a sack. [citation needed] The Mongols had extraordinary military discipline, extraordinary endurance and were above all practical, readily assimilating advanced siege technology. When they slaughtered whole populations, they almost always spared the engineers and technicians, swiftly assimilating them into the Mongol armies. Finally, the Mongols regarded the European fixation with "honor" and glory in battle as absurd. They were concerned with one thing, and one thing only: winning and conquest. How they did so was of no concern, so long as they prevailed. While the Knight and Samurai were determined to cement their places in history with deeds of daring, the Mongols were busy conquering the world, or virtually all of it.
[edit] Battlefield tactics
The Mongols were masters of the feigned retreat, which is perhaps the most difficult battlefield tactic to execute. Pretending disarray and defeat, they would turn and run, only to pivot when the enemy was drawn out, and destroy them at their leisure.
The tomens would typically advance on a broad front, five lines deep. The first three lines would be comprised of horse archers, the last two of lancers. Once an enemy force was located, the Mongols would try and avoid risky or reckless frontal assaults (in sharp contrast to their European and Middle-Eastern opponents). Instead they would use diversionary attacks to fix the enemy in place, while their main forces sought to outflank or surround the foe. First the horse archers would lay down a withering barrage of arrow fire. Additional arrows were carried by camels who followed close by, ensuring a plentiful supply of ammunition.
To avoid the deadly hail of missiles, enemies would frequently spread out, or seek cover, breaking up their formations and making them more vulnerable to the lancers' charges. Likewise, when they packed themselves together, into dense square or phalanx style formations, they would become more vulnerable to the arrows. Once the enemy was deemed sufficiently weakened, the noyans would give the order and the drums would beat and the signal flags wave, telling the lancers to begin their charge. Often the devasation of the arrows was enough to rout an enemy, so the lancers were only needed to help pursue and mop up the remnants.
When facing European armies, with their emphasis on heavy cavalry, it was obviously not the Mongol's style to engage in heavy melee combat against a strong and unshaken foe, but rather picked off the heavy cavalry at long distances with their bows. In the few cases where armor actually withstood their arrows, the Mongols simply killed the Knight's horses, leaving a heavily armored man afoot, unable to go any distance. At the Battle of Mohi, the Mongols left open a gap in their ranks, luring the Hungarians into retreating through it, which resulted in their being strung out over all the countryside, and easy pickings for mounted archers who simply galloped along and picked them off, while the lancers skewered them as they fled. At Legnica, the Teutonic, Templar and Hospitaller knights were able to make a stand dismounted, and inflicted unusually heavy causalities on the Mongols - but were killed to a man in the end. The Mongols simply accepted the casualties, and destroyed the Knights.
The Mongol battlefield tactics were a combination of masterful training combined with excellent communication and the ability to follow orders in the chaos of combat. They trained for virtually every possibility, so when it occurred, they could react accordingly. Unlike many of their foes, the Mongols also protected their ranking officers well. Their training and discipline allowed them to fight without the need for constant supervision or rallying, which often placed commanders in dangerous positions.
Whenever possible, Mongol commanders found the highest ground available, from where they could make tactical decisions based on the best view of the battlefield as events unfolded. Furthermore, being on high ground allowed their forces to observe commands conveyed by flags more easily than if the ground were level. In addition, keeping the high command on high ground made them easier to defend. Unlike the European armies, which placed enormous emphasis on personal valor, and thus exposed their leaders to death from anyone bold enough to kill them, the Mongols regarded their leaders as a vital asset. A general such as Subutai, unable to ride a horse in the later part of his career, due to age and obesity, would have been ridiculed out of most any European army of the time. No one would have respected him, let alone obeyed his orders. But the Mongols recognized and respected the still powerful military mind buried within the old fat man, who afterall, had been one of the Genghis Khan's most able subbordinates, and so they cheerfully hauled him around in a cart. This in stark contrast to the fate of Frederick Barbarossa, who drowned attempting to ford a river in his old age, the Mongols preferred to keep their great leader safe in his cart.
[edit] Areas that Avoided Mongol Conquest
Essentially, only three areas accessible to the Mongols avoided conquest by them. Why did the Mongols not go on, and conquer Europe as easily as they did Russia? The most popular explanation was the fact that on 11 December 1241, during pre-emptive operations by Mongol reconnaisance forces inside Austria for the invasion of Vienna, news came that Ogedei Khan died, and bound by Mongol tradition, all Mongol commanders and princes had to report back to the capital of Karakorum to elect a new Khan. It was believed that the Mongol abandonment of the European campaign was only temporary, but in fact, the Mongols had committed no further campaigns into Europe in earnest. Some western historians attribute European survival to Mongol unwillingness to fight in the more densely populated German principalities, where the wetter weather affected their bows. But the same weather did not stop them from devastating Russia, and Europe was far less densely populated than China.[citations needed]The probable answer for the Mongol's stopping after the Mohi River, and the destruction of the Hungarian army, was that they never intended to advance further at that time.[citations needed] Batu Khan had made his Russian conquests safe for the next 10 generations, and when the Great Khan died, he rushed back to Mongolia to put in his claim for power. Upon his return, relations with his cousin Guyuk Khan had deteriorated to the point that open warfare between them came shortly after Guyuk's death. Had the Great Khan given Batu, and Subutai, who was planning an invasion of central Europe, the forces to mount such, it would have doubtless conquered with relative ease. The point is that the Mongols were unable to bring a unified army to bear on either Europe, or Egypt, after 1260. Bluntly, had the Mongol Great Khanate remained intact, and not fallen apart due to infighting between the various cousins, the European powers and the Mamluke Sultanate would have either surrendered to the authority of the Great Khan, or more likely, been conquered and razed. Batu Khan was in fact planning invasion of Europe all the way to the "Great Sea," the Atlantic Ocean, when he died in 1255. His son inherited the Khanate, but also died in a short time, and Batu's brother Berke became Khan of the Kipchak Khanate. He was far more interested in fighting with his cousin Hulagu than invading the remainder of Europe, which was no threat to him.
[edit] Conclusion
The Mongol military was so far advanced over their colleagues worldwide, that only infighting defeated them. Tribute must also be paid to the heroic defense of the holy land by the Mamluks, and of Japan by her samurai. But in both cases, had the Mongols brought their entire military to bear, without nature intervening, they would have won. Japan was spared by a storm, which destroyed enough of the Mongol fleet to allow the assembled armies of Japan to triumph in a close fought series of battles over the remnant of the invasion force. The Mamluks were created to oppose the European knights and performed also against the Mongols. They triumphed because of the fallout between the heirs of Batu and Hulagu Khan. The same infighting spared Europe. Western Europe, the Mamluk Sultanate, and Japan were the only three powers which avoided destruction or conquest by the Mongols, and had the Mongols brought their full power to bear, none likely would have.
[edit] References
- Amitai-Preiss, Reuven. The Mamluk-Ilkhanid War, 1998
- Chambers, James, The Devil's Horsemen: The Mongol Invasion of Europe
- R.E. Dupuy and T.N. Dupuy, The Encyclopedia Of Military History: From 3500 B.C. To The Present. (2nd Revised Edition 1986)
- Hildinger, Eric, Warriors of the Steppe: A Military History of Central Asia, 500 B.C. to A.D. 1700 *Morgan, David -- The Mongols, ISBN 0-631-17563-6
- Nicolle, David, -- The Mongol Warlords Brockhampton Press, 1998
- Charles Oman, The History of the Art of War in the Middle Ages (1898, rev. ed. 1953)
- Reagan, Geoffry, The Guinness Book of Decisive Battles , Canopy Books, NY (1992)
- Saunders, J.J. -- The History of the Mongol Conquests, Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, 1971, ISBN 0-8122-1766-7
- Sicker, Martin -- The Islamic World in Ascendancy: From the Arab Conquests to the Siege of Vienna, Praeger Publishers, 2000
- Soucek, Svatopluk -- A History of Inner Asia, Cambridge, 2000
- Verbruggen, J.F., -- The Art of Warfare in Western Europe during the Middle Ages, Boydell Press, Second English translation 1997, ISBN 0-85115-570
[edit] External links
Medieval History: Mongol Invasion of Europe at http://historymedren.about.com/library/prm/bl1mongolinvasion.htm
