Intermediate scrutiny
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Intermediate scrutiny, in U.S. constitutional law, is the middle level of scrutiny applied by courts deciding constitutional issues through judicial review. The others levels are typically referred to as rational basis review (less rigorous) and strict scrutiny (most rigorous).
Intermediate scrutiny is met if a regulation involves important governmental interests that are furthered by substantially related means. In modern constitutional law, the intermediate scrutiny test applies not only to the federal government, but also to the state and local government (via the Fourteenth Amendment). It also applies to both legislative and executive action whether those actions be of a substantive or procedural nature.
A famous example of intermediate scrutiny comes from Craig v. Boren, which was the first case in which a majority of the United States Supreme Court determined that statutory or administrative sex classifications had to be subjected to an intermediate standard of judicial review.
Regarding sex-based classifications, however, the U.S. Supreme Court, in United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996), added the requirement that, to be valid, a sex-based classification requires an "exceedingly persuasive justification." In practice, this means that Court examinations of sex-based classifications are closer to strict scrutiny.
Other matters that have been subjected to medium scrutiny include restrictions based on status as a non-marital child and affirmative action programs established by the federal government (Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC (89-453), 497 U.S. 547 (1990). Although, the latter was overruled by the Supreme Court in Adarand Constructors v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200 (1995), which held that all race-based classifications must be subjected to strict scrutiny.
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