Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat

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The Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (Arabic: الجماعة السلفية للدعوة والقتال; French: Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat, GSPC; also known as Group for Call and Combat) is a militant Sunni Islamist group which aims to overthrow the Algerian government and institute an Islamic state. It is Wahhabist, although its members prefer to call themselves Salafis. The group has declared its intention to attack Algerian, French, and American targets.

The GSPC has been designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the U.S. Department of State.

1 History
2 Timeline of GSPC Related Events
3 Speculation about international links
4 Notes
5 External links

[edit] History

The GSPC was founded by Hassan Hattab, a former Armed Islamic Group (GIA) regional commander who broke with the GIA in 1998 in protest over the GIA's slaughter of civilians. After an amnesty in 1999, many former GIA fighters laid down their arms, but a few remained active, including members of the GSPC.^[1] Estimates of the number of GSPC members vary widely, from a few hundred to as many as 4000.^[2] In September 2003, it was reported that Hattab had been deposed as national emir of the GSPC and replaced by Nabil Sahraoui (Sheikh Abou Ibrahim Mustapha), a 39 year-old former GIA commander who was subsequently reported to have pledged the GSPC's allegiance to al-Qaeda,^[3] a step which Hattab had opposed.^[4]^[1] Following the death of Sahraoui in June 2004, Abu Musab Abdel Wadoud became the leader of the GSPC.^[5] Abdelmadjid Dichou is also reported to have headed the group.^{[citation needed]}

A splinter of Hattab's group, the Free Salafist Group (GSL), has been linked with the kidnapping of 32 European tourists in Algeria in early 2003.^[1] Other sources claim the involvement of the Algerian intelligence services.^[6]

By March 2005, sources say that the GSPC "may be prepared to give up the armed struggle in Algeria and accept the government's reconciliation initiative."^[7]. In March 2006, the group's former leader, Hassan Hattab, called on its members to accept a government amnesty under which they can lay down their guns in return for immunity from prosecution.^[8]

In September of 2006 the top Al-Qaida leader Ayman al-Zawahri announced a "blessed union" between the groups in declaring France an enemy. They said they would work together against French and American interests.^[9]

The Group appears now to be headed by Emir Abu Musab Abdelwadoud (real name Abdel Malik Droukdel).

[edit] Timeline of GSPC Related Events

In September 1998, Hassan Hattab breaks away from the GIA to found the GSPC^[1]

On October 15, 2001, 11 village guards are killed in an ambush while fetching water in the Tebessa region near the Tunisian border. Reports blame about 20 GSPC militants.^[10]

On May 5, 2002, 15 government soldiers are killed in an ambush near Tizi Ouzou, in the Kabylie region of northern Algeria. About 50 members of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) were blamed for the assault.^[11]

On September 19, 2002, 15 people are reported to have been arrested in Kabylie under suspicion of providing money and logistical help to the GSPC^[12]

Between 22 February and 24 March 2003, the Free Salafist Group or GSL, a splinter group of the GSPC led by Amari Saïfi (Abderrazak “El Para”), allegedly captures 32 European tourists in southern Algeria. On 13 May 2003, seventeen hostages are released and 2 militants are killed in a gun battle (not sure - the release also could have been a fake) in the Algerian desert. The remaining fighters, with fifteen hostages, flee to northern Mali. After receiving a purported €5 million ransom paid by the German government,^[13] the GSL/GSPC releases the fourteen remaining hostages on 19 August, 2003.^[14] The fifteenth hostage, a German, died of heat exhaustion. ^[15]

In September 2003, Nabil Sahraoui was reported to have replaced Hassan Hattab as leader of the GSPC but other media reports have denied that any change has taken place.^[3]

On February 7, 2004, the Algerian Army attacks the band of militants in northern Mali, from where they are chased eastward across northern Niger and into Chad.^[14]

On March 9, 2004, members of the GSL/GSPC fight a gun battle with troops from Niger and Chad, supported by U.S. Special Forces, just inside Chad. 43 Salafi fighters from several West and North African countries are killed. The band's leader and the GSPC's overall number two, Amari Saïfi, escapes but is later captured by a Chadian rebel group, Movement for Democracy and Justice in Chad (Mouvement pour la démocratie et la justice au Tchad or MDJT).^[14]

On June 20, 2004, Sahraoui is reported killed in gun battles with Algerian Army, along with many other high-level members of the group.^[16]

On June 21, 2004, a car bomb injures 11 people and damages the main electricity plant in the capital Algiers. The GSPC claims responsibility.^[17]

In Autumn 2004, Abu Musab Abdel Wadoud (aka Abdel Malik Daroqedel, Abdelmalik Dourkdal or Abou Mossaab Abdelouadoud) succeeds Nabil Sahraoui as head of the GSPC.^[5]

At the end of October 2004, Amari Saïfi ("El Para") is handed over to the Libyan government, which sent him to be tried in Algeria.^[14]

On June 6, 2005, days before American soldiers arrive in the Sahel region for a military exercise named "Flintlock 2005", 15 Mauritanian soldiers are killed in an attack on the Lemgheity army base on the north-eastern border with Algeria and Mali. The Mauretanian authorities blame the GSPC, pointing to a statement on a GSPC-affiliated website as evidence. Others doubt the GSPC is responsible and suspect involvement of the Algerian security forces. Mauretanian journalists say that the report has not been independently verified and that they have been denied access to the wounded in hospital.^[2]

On June 9, 2005, an explosive device kills 13 local government guards in a truck in Algeria's M'sila region southeast of Algiers.^[18]

The GSPC deputy head Amari Saïfi is imprisoned for life on 25 June 2005.^[19]

In a September 2005 interview, Abu Musab Abdel Wadoud condemns the Algerian government's "peace and reconciliation agreement". He claims to have cut ties with the GSPC's founder, Hassan Hattab who supports the agreement and calls on the GSPC to lay down its arms.^[5]^[4]

On November 17, 2005, three Algerian nationals are arrested in Naples, Italy on suspicion of planning a terrorist attack. They are said to have had contacts with Salafist groups in Algeria, notably the GSPC. ^[20]

On February 1, 2006, the Algerian daily Liberté reports that spiritual leader Ahmed Abou al-Baraa (real name Ahmed Zarabib) has been killed by Algerian government forces in the mountains near Toudja on January 17.^[21]

On March 30, 2006, Hassan Hattab, a founder of the group, is reported to have called on its remaining members to accept an amnesty offered by the Algerian government.^[8]

On September 14, 2006, al-Qaeda announced it will will join the GSPC in their fight against France. They plan to attack France, the United States, and their allies.^[22]^[23]

[edit] Speculation about international links

GSPC Area of Operations & Pan-Sahel Initiative nations

Algerian officials and authorities from neighbouring countries have long speculated that the GSPC may be active outside Algeria. However, these activities most likely have to do with the GSPC's long-standing involvement with the black economy - smuggling, protection rackets and money laundering across the borders of Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Libya and Chad - which provides the group's financial underpinnings.^[1] However, recent developments seem to indicate that a splinter group may have sought refuge in the Tuareg regions of northern Mali and Niger following crackdowns by Algerian government forces in the North and South of the country since 2003.^[14]

A number of observers have voiced strong doubts regarding the GSPC's capacity to carry out large-scale attacks such as the one in northeastern Mauritania during the "Flintlock 2005" military exercise.^[24] They suspect the involvement of Algeria's Department of Intelligence and Security (DRS) in an effort to improve Algeria's international standing (as a credible partner in the "war against terrorism") and to lure the United States into the region.^[6]

Allegations of GSPC's links to al-Qaeda predate the attacks of September 11, 2001. As followers of a Qutbist strand of jihadist Salafism, the members of the GSPC are thought to share al-Qaeda's general worldview. After the desposition of the group's founder, Hassan Hattab, in 2003, various leaders of the group have pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda. However, the GSPC is committed to a nationalist agenda (jihad inside Algeria) and uninterested in al-Qaeda's objectives of global jihad. Some observers believe that the GSPC's connection to al-Qaeda is most likely nominal (i.e. opportunistic), not operational.^[14] Claims of GSPC activities in Italy^[25] are disputed by other sources, who say that there is no evidence of any engagement in terrorist activities against US, European or Israeli targets: "While the GSPC [...] ha[s] established support networks in Europe and elsewhere, these have been limited to ancillary functions (logistics, fund-raising, propaganda), not acts of terrorism or other violence outside Algeria."^[1] Investigations in France and Britain have concluded that young Algerian immigrants sympathetic to the GSPC or al-Qaeda have taken up the name without any real connection to either group.^[2]

Similar claims of links between the GSPC and Abu Musab Al Zarqawi in Iraq^[26] are based on purported letters to Zarqawi by GSPC leader Abu Musab Abdel Wadoud.^[27] In a September 2005 interview, Abu Musab Abdel Wadoud hailed Zarqawi's actions in Iraq.^[5] Like the GSPC's earlier public claims of allegiance to al-Qaeda, they are thought to be opportunistic legitimation efforts of the GSPC's leaders due to the lack of representation in Algeria's political sphere.^[1]

After years of absence, the United States has begun to show renewed military interest in the region^[28]^[29] and staged the "Flintlock 2005" exercise, which involved US Special Forces training soldiers from Algeria, Senegal, Mauritania, Mali and Chad. The United States alleges that the Sahel region has become a training ground for Islamist recruits.^[30] Yet the two most important pieces of evidence of 'terrorist activity' - the tourist kidnapping of 2003 and the attack on the Mauritanian army base just as "Flintlock" got underway - have been called into question.^[31]^[24]

Observers say that the region's governments have much to gain from associating^[32] local armed movements and long-established smuggling operations with al-Qaeda and a global 'War on Terrorism'.^[24]^[14] In June 2005, while the "Flintlock" exercise was still underway, Mauritania asked "Western countries interested in combating the terrorist surge in the African Sahel to supply it with advanced military equipment."^[33]