Talk:Pragmatic theory of truth
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Why is Habermas used to explain the consensus theory of truth. Why not put that text on the consensus page and link to it? --Reagle 21:42, 23 May 2005 (UTC)
I'm going to delete the first objections paragraph because it refers to things (e.g. the ideal limit of inquiry) that do not appear in the definition of the pragmatic theory that precedes it. Perhaps it makes sense as an objection to some particular philosopher's pragmatic theory of truth, but if so then that theory should be presented here before the objection to it is presented.
I'm also going to delete the "infallibility" objection. It may be true that so long as he believes what is useful, he is infallible (on the pragmatic theory), but this "objection" would apply to any and all theories of truth that there ever have been or ever could be. This is because you can insert the definiens of any definition of truth in place of the bold text above. For examples:
so long as he believe what coheres, he is infallible (on the coherence theory)
so long as he believes what corresponds to the facts, he is infallible (on the correspondence theory)
etc.
Nathan Ladd (written a couple of weeks ago)
Do you see the difference?
What's with that sort of second-person appeal? It doesn't sound very encyclopedic to me. What about you? --Christofurio 01:25, Jun 24, 2004 (UTC)
Are your three questions directed to me, Christofurio? If so, I need you to elaborate. I can't make sense of what you wrote above. Nathan Ladd 7/3/04 UTC
OK. I see it now. You were quoting a question in the article. That wasn't clear in your remark above. Nathan Ladd
Perhaps you might delve a little into what james MEANT by useful, instead of assuming you and all of us understand right off the bat? You act like a one line statement of the theory is enough to move onto objections. James wrote a book. Lyn Headley
Contents |
[edit] Juvenile Objections
I find this paragraph offensive:
There are many other objections to pragmatism. For example, how do we define what it means to say a belief “works“? Or that it is “useful to believe“? Presumably, it is sometimes useful to tell lies. In this case, pragmatism implies that lies can be true. Presumably this is an absurd conclusion. Suppose that religion is useful to believe. Then, according to James's theory, it is true. But why should it follow that God exists merely because believing that God exists is useful? More worryingly, in the Soviet Union under Stalin, certain beliefs concerning biology were adopted because they were “useful to believe“ and this led to what is called Lysenkoism.
This writer criticizes James' vague word usage, does not bother to actually try and offer possible definitions for James' usage, and then offers a series of objections that represent at best a juvenile understanding of the theory, and at worst an intentional attempt to discredit it.
Believing that it is sometimes useful to tell lies cannot be equated with believing that the lies it is useful to tell are true. This is like saying that believing that eating food is useful means also believing that being eaten is useful as well.
"Suppose that religion is useful to believe" is so vague that it puts James' use of 'useful' to shame. One might as well say "Suppose that man is good." Regardless, individual propositions of specific religions either may or may not be tested, and the ones that may be tested may prove 'useful', as James puts it. If one can test that God exists, say by dying and then meeting him, and believing that he exists has resulted in behavior that God approves of and rewards, then believing in God has indeed been useful. In this case, believing that God exists is useful because God does actually exist; therefore, in this case, if believing in God is useful, God exists.
Lastly, a lot of very stupid things were believed in the Soviet Union under Stalin because Stalin had anyone who suggested ideas he didn't like thrown into prison camps or worse. Furthermore, the pragmatic theory of truth took no part whatsoever in the development of Lysenkoism and its inclusion in this article is as inappropriate as the mention of Nazi death camps in an article about juvenile detention halls.
- Robin Moshe
- Actually, if truth is defined in terms of what is useful, then the usefullness of a lie does imply that it is true.--Nate Ladd 08:57, Mar 9, 2005 (UTC)
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- Okay, I have an admission to make:
I stand by that first sentence, but the second isn't strictly true. A much better comparison is:Believing that it is sometimes useful to tell lies cannot be equated with believing that the lies it is useful to tell are true. This is like saying that believing that eating food is useful means also believing that being eaten is useful as well.
Believing that it is sometimes useful to tell lies cannot be equated with believing that the lies it is useful to tell are true. This is like saying that the belief that paper money can be exchanged for valuable goods and services is equal to the belief that the paper money is itself a valuable good or service.
- Okay, I have an admission to make:
-
- I apologize profusely for my previous failure of reasoning.
- --Robin Moshe 23:14, 18 June 2006 (UTC)
[edit] Long quotes for later exposition
JA: I'm putting this longish quote here until I get time to parcel it out and exegize it. Jon Awbrey 20:54, 29 March 2006 (UTC)
In the article "Truth and Falsity and Error" that he wrote for the Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology (Baldwin 1901), Peirce gave the following definition and discussion of truth.
Truth is a character which attaches to an abstract proposition, such as a person might utter. It essentially depends upon that proposition's not professing to be exactly true. But we hope that in the progress of science its error will indefinitely diminish, just as the error of 3.14159, the value given for π, will indefinitely diminish as the calculation is carried to more and more places of decimals. What we call π is an ideal limit to which no numerical expression can be perfectly true. If our hope is vain; if in respect to some question - say that of the freedom of the will - no matter how long the discussion goes on, no matter how scientific our methods may become, there never will be a time when we can fully satisfy ourselves either that the question has no meaning, or that one answer or the other explains the facts, then in regard to that question there certainly is no truth. But whether or not there would be perhaps any reality is a question for the metaphysician, not the logician. Even if the metaphysician decides that where there is no truth there is no reality, still the distinction between the character of truth and the character of reality is plain and definable. Truth is that concordance of an abstract statement with the ideal limit towards which endless investigation would tend to bring scientific belief, which concordance the abstract statement may possess by virtue of the confession of its inaccuracy and one-sidedness, and this confession is an essential ingredient of truth. (Peirce, Collected Papers, CP 5.565).
JA: Here's another brick'o'wit that's a keystone to Peirce's architectonic, but will take a lot more concrete mortar to trowel into place. Jon Awbrey 14:16, 23 April 2006 (UTC)
Two things here are all-important to assure oneself of and to remember. The first is that a person is not absolutely an individual. His thoughts are what he is "saying to himself", that is, is saying to that other self that is just coming into life in the flow of time. When one reasons, it is that critical self that one is trying to persuade; and all thought whatsoever is a sign, and is mostly of the nature of language. The second thing to remember is that the man's circle of society (however widely or narrowly this phrase may be understood), is a sort of loosely compacted person, in some respects of higher rank than the person of an individual organism. It is these two things alone that render it possible for you — but only in the abstract, and in a Pickwickian sense — to distinguish between absolute truth and what you do not doubt. (Peirce 1905, CP 5.421).
JA: Another tidbit that seems like it ought to be good for something, but I just don't know where or what yet. Jon Awbrey 18:34, 24 April 2006 (UTC)
Later in the same article, Peirce adds the following distinctions:
All the above relates to complex truth, or the truth of propositions. This is divided into many varieties, among which may be mentioned ethical truth, or the conformity of an assertion to a speaker's or writer's belief, otherwise called veracity, and logical truth, that is, the concordance of a proposition with reality, in such a way as is above defined.
The word truth has also had great importance in philosophy in widely different senses, in which it is distinguished as simple truth, which is that truth which inheres in other subjects than propositions.
Plato in the Cratylus (385B) maintains that words have truth; and some of the scholastics admitted that an incomplex sign, such as a picture, may have truth. (Peirce 1901, CP 5.570–571).
[edit] Caution
The text added at this dif [1]was criticised at truth. It should, I think, be treated with some caution, especially since it contains no citations, and may well be original research. Banno 21:07, 18 April 2006 (UTC)
JA: Nota Bene. Normal conduct dictates asking for citations before accusing people of originality. Jon Awbrey 21:14, 18 April 2006 (UTC)
[edit] Earnest request
JA: Could editors please try to use roughly scholarly citation styles on this article? The superscript mess has not been used in serious journals for a long time now. It encourages sloppiness in important things like page references, just for starters, and eventually people start abbreviating citations to the point that they cannot be checked anymore. Also, one of the main things that led to the premature busts in the 3 or 4 brief booms in pragmatic ideas during the last century was precisely the sort of the half-truths and 1-liner buzz phrases that secondary and tertiary sources are so liable to generate. If you care about this subject at all, I beg you not to take us down that road again. Gratia in futuro, Jon Awbrey 22:45, 19 April 2006 (UTC)
