Operation Menu

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Operation Menu
Part of Vietnam Conflict
B-52 bombers carry out a strike
Date 18 March 1969 to 28 May 1970 Location Eastern Cambodia Result Intensification of Cambodian Civil War
Combatants
United States (US)	Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) NLF

Operation Menu was the codename for a top-secret United States Air Force bombing campaign conducted in eastern Cambodia from 18 March 1969 until 26 May 1970, during the Vietnam Conflict. The targets of these attacks were sanctuaries and Base Areas of the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN), which utilized them for resupply, training, and resting between campaigns across the border in the Republic of Vietnam.

Contents 1 Background 2 Breakfast 3 The System 4 Exposure? 5 Revelations 6 Aftermath 7 Notes 8 Sources 9 See also

[edit] Background

Main article: History of Cambodia

Main article: Sihanouk Trail

From the onset of hosilities in South Vietnam and Laos in the early 1960s, Prince Norodom Sihanouk had maintained a delicate domestic and foreign policy balancing act. Convinced of the inevitable victory of the communists in South Vietnam and concerned for the future existance of his nation, Sihanouk swung toward the left in the mid-1960s.^[1]

In 1966 Sihanouk made an agreement with Chou En-lai of the People's Republic of China that would allow North Vietnamese forces to establish Base Areas in Cambodia and to use the port of Sihanoukville for the delivery of military materiel.^[2] The US, now heavily involved in South Vietnam, was not eager to violate the neutrality of Cambodia, which had been guaranteed by the Geneva Accord of 1954. The neutrality of Cambodia, however, did not prevent President Lyndon B. Johnson from authorizing covert reconnaissance operations by the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam Studies and Observations Group beginning in 1967.^[3] The mission of the highly-classified unit was to obtain intelligence on the Base Areas that would be presented to Sihanouk in hopes of changing his position. ^[4]

By late 1968, Sihanouk, under pressure from the political right and from the US, agreed to more normalized relations with the Americans.^[5] In July 1968, he hd agreed to reopen diplomatic relations and, in August, formed a Government of National Salvation under the pro-American General Lon Nol.^[6] Newly-inaugurated President Richard M. Nixon, seeking any means by which to withdraw from Southeast Asia and obtain "peace with honor," saw an opening with which to buy time for the American withdrawal and for the new policy of Vietnamization.

Nixon had already been approached by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) with a proposal to bomb COSVN the elusive headquarters of PAVN southern operations, located somewhere in the Fishhook region of eastern Cambodia. Nixon was already angry with the PAVN for launching rocket and artillery attacks against Saigon, which he considered a violation of the "agreement" made when the US halted the bombing of North Vietnam in November 1968.^[7] Before the diplomatic amenities with Sihanouk were even concluded, Nixon had decided to bomb the Cambodian sanctuaries. The bombings would serve three purposes: they would signal to Hanoi Nixon's resolve; serve as a shield for the American withdrawal and Vietnamization; and offer proof of American firmness "that might pay dividends at the negotiating table in Paris."^[8]

On 22 February, in the period just following the Tet holidays, PAVN/NLF forces launched an offensive that seemed purposely aimed at inflicting US casualties. Nixon, who was enroute to Europe for meetings with Allied leaders, ordered his National Security Advisor, Dr. Henry Kissinger, to prepare for the strikes. He then cabled Colonel Alexander Haig, an NSC staff aide, to meet him in Brussels along with Colonel Raymond B. Sitton, a SAC officer on the JCS staff, to formulate a plan of action.^[9]

[edit] Breakfast

The bombing began on the night of 18 March with a raid by 60 B-52 bombers, based at Anderson Air Force Base, Guam. The target was Base Area 353, the supposed location of COSVN in the Fishhook.^[10] Although the crews were briefed that their mission was to take place in South Vietnam, 48 of the bombers were diverted across the Cambodian border and dropped 2,400 tons of bombs.^[11] The mission was designated Breakfast, after the morning Pentagon planning session at which it was devised.

Breakfast was so successful that the American commander in South Vietnam, General Creighton Abrams provided a list of 15 more known Base Areas for targeting.^[12] During the next 14 months the operation continued. The five remaining missions that made up the operation and their targets were: Lunch (Base Area 609), Snack (Base Area 351), Dinner (Base Area 352), Supper (Base Area 740), and Dessert (Base Area 350). The Strategic Air Command (SAC) flew 3,630 B-52 sorties against these targets, and dropped 108,823 tons of ordnance during the missions.^[13] Due to the continued reference to gastronomic situations in the codenames, the entire series of missions was refferred to as Operation Menu.

Nixon and Kissinger went to great lengths to keep the missions secret. The expansion of the American effort into "neutral" Cambodia was sure to cause serious debate in Congress, negative criticism in the media, and were sure to spark anti-war protests on American college campuses. In order to prevent this, an elaborate dual reporting system covering the missions had been formulated during the Brussels meeting between Nixon, Haig, and Colonel Sitton.

[edit] The System

First, the number of individuals who had complete knowledge of the operation was kept to a bare minimum. All communications concerning the missions was split along two paths - one route was overt, ordering typical B-52 missions that were to take place in South Vietnam near the Cambodian border - the second route was covert, utilizing back-channel messages between commanders ordering the classified missions. For example: General Abrams would request a Menu strike. His request went to Admiral John McCain, the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Command CINCPAC, in Honolulu. McCain forwarded it to the Joint Chiefs in Washington, who, after reviewing it, passed it on to Melvin Laird, the Secretary of Defense (who might consult with the president). The Joint Chiefs then passed the command for the strike to General Bruce K. Holloway, Commander of SAC, who then notified Lieutenant General Alvin C. Gillem, Commander of the 3rd Air Division on Guam.^[14]

At the time, Air Force Major Hal Knight was the supervisor of a MSQ-77 Combat Skyspot radar site at Bien Hoa, South Vietnam. "Skyspot" was a radar-controlled bombing system utilized to direct B-52 strikes to their targets. Every day a courier plane would arrive from SAC's Advanced Echelon Office at Ton Son Nhut Air Base. Knight was given a revised list of target coordinates for the next day's missions. That evening, the coordinates were fed into targeting computers and then relayed to the aircraft as they came on station. Only the pilots and navigators of the aircraft (who had been personally briefed by General Gillem and sworn to secrecy) knew of the true location of the targets.^[15] The bombers then flew on to their targets and delivered their bombs.

Knight then gathered the paperwork and computer tapes and burned them in an incinerator. He then called a special phone number in Saigon and reported that "The ball game is over."^[16] The aircrews filled out routine reports of hours flown, fuel burned, and bombs dropped. This dual system maintained secrecy and provided Air Force logisticians and personnel administrators with information that they needed to replace air crews or aircraft and replenish stocks of fuel and munitions.^[17]

[edit] Exposure?

Although Sihanouk was not informed by the US about the operation, he did remain quiet about the illegal bombing of his country. His silent acquiescence may have been prompted by a desire to see the North Vietnamese out of Cambodia, since he himself was precluded from pressing them too hard.^[18] After the event, it was claimed by Nixon and Kissinger that Sihanouk had given his tacit approval for the raids, but this claim has since been disproved.^[19]

On 9 May 1969, an innacurate article by military reporter William Beecher describing the bombing was run in the New York Times. Beecher claimed that an unnamed source within the administration had provided the information. Nixon was furious when he heard the news and ordered Dr. Kissinger to obtain the assistance of FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover and discover the source of the leak.^[20] Hoover suspected Kissinger's own NSC aide, Mortin Halperin, of the deed and so informed Kissinger. Halperin's phone was then illegally tapped for 21 months.^[21] This was the first in a series of illegal surveillance activities authorized by Nixon in the name of national security. The administration was relieved when no other significant press reports concerning the operation appeared.

For those in Washington who were cognizant of the Menu raids, the silence of one participant came as a surprise. The North Vietnamese made no protest concerning the bombings. They did not denounce the raids for propaganda purposes, and, according to Dr. Kissinger, they "did not raise the matter during formal or secret negotiations."^[22] Hanoi had no wish to either void Cambodia's neutrality or to acknowledge the presence of their forces there.

[edit] Revelations

Main article: Watergate Scandal

For four years Menu remained unknown to Congress, the media, and the American public. That situation changed in December 1972, when Major Knight wrote a letter to to Senator William Proxmire, asking for "clarification" as to US policy on the bombing of Cambodia. Knight, who had become concerned over the legality of his actions, had complained to his superior officer, Colonel David Patterson. He then recieved several bad efficiency reports, which had ruined his career, and had been discharged from the Air Force.^[23]

Proxmire's further questioning led to hearings in the Senate Armed Services Committee, which eventually demanded that the Defense Department turn over all records of US air operations in Cambodia. When they arrived, the records showed no no mention of the Menu strikes. The committee, was not convinced and the investigation continued. Less than two weeks later, the committee opened hearings on the nomination of General George Brown to become chief of staff of the Air Force. As commander of the Seventh Air Force in South Vietnam, Brown was privy to the Menu operation and disclosed as much to the committee.

For the next eight days the committee listened to the testimony of administration officials trying to justify their actions. The committee uncovered excuses and lies that were perhaps more alarming than Watergate.^[24] They raised "fundamental questions as to military discipline and honesty, of civilian control over the military, and of Congressional effectiveness."^[25] It was basically agreed that the deception employed during Menu went beyond covertness. According to Air Force historian Colonel Earl Tilford, "Deception to fool the enemy was one thing, but lying to Congress and key members of the government, including the chief of staff of the Air Force and the secretary of the Air Force, was something else."^[26]

[edit] Aftermath

Main article: Cambodian Civil War

Main article: Operation Patio

Main article: Operation Freedom Deal

The Constitutional questions that were posed by the revelations made at the committee hearings were made moot when the House Judiciary Committee voted (21-12) against including the administration's falsification of records in the articles of impeachment leveled against President Nixon.^[27]

The result of the attacks themselves are still debated among participants and historians. As for preventing further North Vietnamese offensives, it failed. In May 1969 the PAVN/VC launched an offensive similar in size to that of the mini-Tet offensive of the previous year. It certainly cost the North Vietnamese effort and manpower to disperse and camouflage their Cambodian sanctuaries to prevent losses to air attack. The raids were claimed as a success by the administration, which believed that air power could provide a shield for wihdrawal and Vietnamization. It certainly emboldened Nixon to launch the Cambodian Incursion of 1970.

There was no doubt that they also set Cambodia on the road to an abyss of violence that Sihanouk had worked so hard to avoid. On 18 March 1970, the prince was overthrown by the National Assembly and replaced by Lon Nol. The Nixon administration, callously unaware of the weakness of Lon Nol's forces, was loath to commit American military force to the conflict in any form other than air power. In the meantime, Sihanouk threw his support behind the communists and ignited a full-scale civil war. This series of events forced the North Vietnamese (who had been satisfied with Sihanouk's neutrality) to unleash their forces against the weak military of the newly-proclaimed Khmer Republic. It also forced them to provide arms and support for their despised Chinese-supported allies, the Khmer Rouge. Cambodia was on the slippery slope to genocide.

[edit] Notes

1. ^ Arnold Issacs, Gordon Hardy, MacAlister Brown, et al, Pawns of War: Cambodia and Laos. Boston: Boston Publishing Company, 1987, p. 83.
2. ^ Issacs, Hardy, & Brown, p. 85.
3. ^ Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Command History 1967, Annex F, Saigon, 1968, p. 4..
4. ^ US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Command History 1968 Annex F, Saigon, 1969, p. 27.
5. ^ Issacs, Hardy, & Brown, p. 88
6. ^ Issacs, Hardy, and Brown, p. 90.
7. ^ Bernard C. Nalty, Air War over South Vietnam, 1968-1975. Washington DC: Air Force History and Museums Program, 2000, p. 128.
8. ^ Nalty, p. 129.
9. ^ The Editors of the Boston Publishing Company, War in the Shadows. Boston: Boston Publishing Company, 1988, p. 136.
10. ^ William Shawcross, Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon, and the Destruction of Cambodia. New York: Washington Square press, 1979, pps. 23-24.
11. ^ John Morocco, Rain of Fire: Air War, 1969-1973. Boston: Boston Publishing Company, 1985, p. 13.
12. ^ Morocco, p. 13.
13. ^ Morocco, p. 13.
14. ^ This chain of command system is covered in Nalty, p. 130.
15. ^ Morocco, p. 14. See also William C. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports. Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, 1976, p. 389.
16. ^ Morocco, p. 14.
17. ^ Nalty, p. 131.
18. ^ Isaacs, Hardy, & Brown, p. 89.
19. ^ Shawcross, pps. 68-71 & 93-94.
20. ^ Morocco, p. 14.
21. ^ War in the Shadows, p. 141.
22. ^ Nalty, p. 132.
23. ^ Shawcross, p. 287.
24. ^ US Senate, Hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee. Bombing in Cambodia. United States Senate, 93rd Cong, 1st sess. Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1973.
25. ^ Shawcross, p. 287.
26. ^ Earl H. Tilford, Setup: What the Air Force did in Vietnam and Why. Maxwell Air Force Base AL: Air University Press, 1991, p. 196.
27. ^ War in the Shadows, p. 149.

[edit] Sources

Unpublished Government Documents

• Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Command History 1967, Annex F, Saigon, 1968.

• Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Command History 1968, Annex F, Saigon, 1969.

Published Government Documents

• Nalty, Bernard C. Air War over South Vietnam, 1968-1975. Washington DC: Air Force Museums and History Program, 2000.

• Tilford, Earl H. Setup: What the Air force did in Vietnam and Why. Maxwell Air Force base AL: Air University Press, 1991.

Secondary Accounts

• The Editors of the Boston Publishing Company, War in the Shadows. Boston: Boston Publishing Company, 1988.

• Issacs, Arnold, Gordon Hardy, MacAlister Brown, et al, Pawns of War: Cambodia and Laos. Boston: Boston Publishing Company, 1987.

• Morocco, John, Rain of Fire: Air War, 1969-1973. Boston: Boston Publishing Company, 1985.

• Shawcross, William, Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon, and the Destruction of Cambodia. New York: Washington Square Books, 1979.

• Westmoreland, William C. A Soldier Reports. New York: Doubleday, 1976.

[edit] See also

• History of Cambodia
• Vietnam War