Talk:Natural law

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Contents 1 history 2 other view 3 transcendental or immanental? or both? 4 reorganization? 5 merge 6 Political party 7 Holding place for more philosophy quotes for later addition 8 Holding place re Bertrand Russell: quotes etc for later addition 9 Anarchist law 10 Merge 11 Teleological? 12 Alternate spellings 13 Daoism?

[edit] history

(There should be a more exact history of the natural law, e.g. that the idea first appeared in the Roman Law.)

[edit] other view

Should probably also mention that natural law is used by people such as Thomas Hobbes to justify political absolutism... the article right now doesn't cover that aspect. ~ Booyabazooka 01:26, 30 Sep 2004 (UTC)

[edit] transcendental or immanental? or both?

serious questions worth an answer:

considering that the unified field of all the laws of nature (the constitution of the universe) is exactly what theology calls holy spirit (god) which is the source of all, and is omnipresent (in the nucleus of every atom in the universe), omniscient (possessing total knowledge and wisdom), and omnipotent (able to manifest infinite creative potential), is there then any real valid difference between transcendental and immanental? and why not call the technique "transcendental meditation" by the term "immanental meditation" since everything is from within the mind anyway?

i personally like the sound of "nature's meditation", since the laws of nature and of nature's god is the fundamental basis for our own existence. what thinkest you?

see:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Natural_law

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Immanentism

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transcendence

[edit] reorganization?

I was curious as to whether there would be consensus regarding a reorganization of this page. I think we might gain additional clarity by treating the topic historically, noting what natural law meant to the stoics, the Thomists, the early moderns, legal scholars, contemporary theorists, etc. This might help avoid the trend to say what natural law "really is," or provide additional defenses/critiques of it in he article. The most recent addition of a long meditation of what it means to be a person, how this relates to nature, and to sexuality, for example, seems alien to natural law tradition of, say, the stoics. Noting that the concept has evolved might avoid such distortions. In some theories, it is inseparable from theology, in some it is very separate, and in some it is oblivious to theological questions. It might also be good to note that natural law legal theories have diverged from their philosophic roots; this would avoid the cross-disciplinary confusion that can oftentimes result. -RJC 02:20, 7 Jun 2005 (UTC)

The article as it is now it is all over the place in some parts and is not very reader friendly so a reorganization, I would imagine, would be well received. -- PullUpYourSocks 02:46, 7 Jun 2005 (UTC)

[edit] merge

Law of nature (precept) seems related. --Truman Burbank 09:09, 14 October 2005 (UTC)

you're right. Should be merged. Natural law is closely related to the social contract school, of which Hobbes is the first representant. Santa Sangre 13:54, 14 February 2006 (UTC)

If they should be merged, it should be to the Natural Law article, as that is more of a term for a movement that has existed as an umbrella term in social philosophy through many permutations. Nagelfar 15:42, 26 February 2006 (UTC)

I disagree with a merge. It seems to me that LON(p) contains entirely Hobbes stuff; but if included in its entirety into LON, would make that article unbalanced; and would then inevitably be cut down. So its better left where it is. William M. Connolley 16:06, 26 February 2006 (UTC).

I agree with a merge, or a retitling. The more fundamental page is the other one, this sociological page is derivative; that is, the "sociological" natural law is just another example of general "laws" derived by induction (empirical facts, observations). And: when I went hunting for a Wikipedia page after I encountered the following in Hans Reichenbach, Elements of Symbolic Logic, Dover, 1947 (Dover edition 1980, unabridged), I landed on the "wrong" page. In fact both should be connected with the other page the lead, including e.g the following definition:

"Tautological implication is used in mathematics; it is a relation between structural forms and can be established without reference to the particular empirical meanings of the terms involved. In physics, however, we find another type of implication which is not determined by structural form, which holds only between sentences of particular empirical meanings, and whose estabilishment in any particulare case goes back to experience. This synthetic connective implication is what we usually call a natural law, i.e. a physical law, or a biological law, or a sociological law.... it is only a matter of fact that this implication holds [etc]" (bold-face added, italics in the original: Reichenbach, VIII Connective Operations and Modalities, §60. Practical reasons for the introduction of connective operations, p. 355)

This echoes writing by Bertrand Russell, which I will need to investigate (it's in one of his later works, where he discusses natural law in terms of induction. Induction bothered Russell, big-time).

No matter what the decision re a merge, I will do some work on this and add this stuff somewhere on the other article page. wvbaileyWvbailey 14:43, 3 March 2006 (UTC)

How can Natural law be the same as the law of nature? The law of nature is an metaphysical entity that confines our actions within it. As Locke used it, the law of nature determines how far we may exercise our liberties. Natural law, however, is confined to morality. Instead of supplying a framework, it merely is used, by the likes of John Finnis and Lon Fuller, to legitimate laws that are passed. Natural law, in this sense, is consequentialist in effect - Daniel Wilmot, 04 April 2006

No (modern) philosopher would agree that there is, in the singular, "THE Law of Nature" but rather various "laws" and means by which the "laws" are determined, some considered "legitimate", some "inherited", e.g. "laws of nature" determined by observation/induction, by "belief", by "consensus/codification", by "searching ones soul" (Platonism), by "inherited wisdom of the tribe/religion", by "what your mommy told you", etc. Read the quotations below. Unless you are a Platonist, these words are usually used in context of "repeated observation", as in "induction". The words "law of nature" and "natural law" seem to be used interchangeably. E.g. is it a "law of nature" or "a natural law" that a man shall treat another man with respect? Is it a "law of nature" or a "natural law" that the sun rises every morning in the east? wvbaileyWvbailey 14:40, 4 April 2006 (UTC)

I would suggest that it is unnecessary to merge these two articles because Natural Law focuses on Aristotelian philosophy whereas the law of nature precept is focusing on something else.

I disagree with the merge because they are two somewhat different theoretical concepts. The Law of Nature is a material law, as described by Hobbes and utilized by others to depict almost the social laws of pre-societal nature. Natural Law, however, differs from this in the eyes of many thoerists. For example, for Thomas Aquinas, Natural Law is those aspects of the Eternal Law (the laws of the Universe) that apply particularly to mankind. This is like prudence, or practical reason, through which the paricipation of a rational creature can result in a higher form of self-direction.

I also disagree with the merge. Natural law proper is a term of art inside the specialized field of jurisprudence, and should remain its own entry with a link to the "law(s) of nature".

[edit] Political party

What about the U.K. political party of the same name? —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 84.68.72.46 (talk • contribs) .

completely unrelated. similar parties exist around the world. some disambiguation may be necessary.

[edit] Holding place for more philosophy quotes for later addition

-- a work in progress -- [some bold-face has been added for emphasis]

Hume's take on "natural law":

"But to convince ourselves that all the laws of nature and all the operations of bodies without exception, are known only by experience...[an argument follows-- in particular Hume disavows a priori knowledge]...In vain, therefore, should we pretend to determine any single event, or infer any cause or effect, without the assitance of observation and experiment... the utmost effort of human reason is to reduce the principles, productive of natural phenomena, to a greater simplicity, and to resolve the many particular effects into a few general causes, by means of reasonings from analogy, experience, and observation [Hume then asserts that when we arrive at this knowing: "These ultimate springs and principles are totally shut up from human curiosity and enquiry" (Hume, Section IV Part I, GBWW p. 459)]

"It is only after a long course of uniform experiments in any kind, that we attain a firm reliance and security with regard to a particular event"(ibid, Part II p. 462)

David Hume, An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding, reprinted in Great Books of the Western World Encyclopedia Britannica, Volume 35, 1952, p.449ff. This work was published by Hume in 1758 as his rewrite of his "juvenile" Treatise of Human Nature: Being An attempt to introduce the experimental method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects Vol. I, Of The Understanding first published 1739, reprinted as: David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Penguin Classics, 1985. Also see: David Applebaum, The Vision of Hume, Vega, London, 2001: a reprint of a portion of An Inquiry starts on p. 94ff

Bertrand Russell did not agree with this utter denial of a priori knowledge, in fact he expends great energy to convince us otherwise. [source attribution necessary here, plus quotes.] wvbaileyWvbailey 18:49, 3 March 2006 (UTC)

Reichenbach invokes both Hume and Russell:

"We agree with Hume that physical necessity is translatable into statements about repeated concurrences, including the prediction that the same combination will occur in the future without exception. 'Physically necessary is expressible in terms of 'always'."(Reichenbach p 356)

['always' invokes the "all-operator" of logic, usually symbolized as an upside-down A-- Reichenbach uses the older (x) of Principia Mathematica to designate the "all-operator"]

"Russell has suggested that natural laws be expressed as general implications." (Reinchenbach p 356) [Again "general" invokes the "all-operator" he gives the example: (x)[f(x) -> g(x)] where 'f(x)' is 'x is a metal being heated' and 'g(x)' is 'x expands'. Thus the "general implication" reads: "Whenever (any) metal is heated it expands".]

But Reichenbach notes "...some difficulties remaining." [p. 357]

Reichenbach makes great pains to discriminate between two types of logical "connectives" used in speech, and he moves his discussion toward induction and away from deduction, the primary focus of his work:

"...we speak of adjunctive operations and connective operations. An adjunctive operation can be verified by one observation; a connective operation can only be falsified by one observation, whereas in the positive case [a connective operation] can only conform with it. We may also say that the connective operation can be confirmed by one observation, if by 'confirming' we understand 'conforming with', i.e., 'not contradicting'. ... A discussion of this confirmatory evidence belongs in inductive logic, since its use is based on a special form of inductive inference." (§7 Truth Tables, pp. 28-29)

"Since adjunctive operations are verified or fastified by the truth values of the propostions they combine, these operations are also called truth-functions. Connective operations are not truth-functional in this sense; but they can be called truth-functional in a wider sense if they are translatable into other statements that contain only adjunctive operations ... such as hold for repeated observation of events of the same kind." (§7 Truth Tables, pp. 30-31)

Reichenbach asserts that in these cases of connective operations (e.g. that result in "laws of nature") we must read the truth tables from right to left, that is, from the "compound statement" back to the "elementary propositions".

Thus the assertion (the "connective" implication) "IF more than three inches of rain falls THEN we're going to flood" should be read this way:

"Yes my assertion is true, this time: Indeed, more than three inches of rain fell, and indeed it's true that we are flooding."

Thus we have merely confirmed the assertion, rather than proven its "truth". To disprove the assertion we need to demonstrate, at least once, that:

"Oh oh, guess my assertion is wrong: four inches of rain fell and we are not flooding."

Reichenbach further adds distinction between "tautological adjunctive operations" and "nontautological connective operations".

"We showed... that [the analytic connective operations used in deductive reasoning] can be interpreted as tautological adjunctive operations.... [whereas the] synthetic connective implication [used in inductive reasoning] is what we usually call a natural law..." (§60 Practical Reasons for the introduction of connective operations, p.355)

Reichenbach asserts that all tautologies can be reduced to the Law of excluded middle or tertium non datur i.e. P V ~P: "This is its shortest form. It is clear that we can do the same for every tautology. All tautologies have [this] same shortest form ..." (§11 Derivations, p. 52). Dispite the beliefs of Aristotle and Hilbert and Russell excluded middle is not a settled "fact", see more at the linked page. wvbaileyWvbailey 21:04, 3 March 2006 (UTC)

Reichenbach has given the following meaning with regard to so-called nomological formulas: "The term 'nomological', derived from the Greek word 'nomos' meaning 'law', is chosen to express the idea that the formulas are either laws of nature or logical laws. Analytic nomological formulas are tautological formulas [e.g. always true: P V ~P, the tertium non datur, more below], or logical laws; synthetic nomological formulas are laws of nature. The term 'nomological' is therefore a generalization of term 'tautological'" (Reichenbach, p. 360?)

In our example [flying pigs], "Q = P V ~P" is called a "tautology" because it is always true-- either (1) some of the objects are flying pigs or (2) not true that some of the objects are flying pigs or (3) both statements are true. In fact Reichenbach defines "tautology" as the tertium non datur P V ~P:

"All tautologies have the same shortest disjunctive normal form namely [P V ~P] (cf Reichenbach p 52).

wvbaileyWvbailey 15:28, 4 March 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Holding place re Bertrand Russell: quotes etc for later addition

--a work in progress: complicated enough to warrant a new holding place --

Thread is: a priori knowledge exists, as do "universals", and what he calls "general laws".

Russell's essay The Art of Drawing Inferences: > 2 types of logic--

> (1) deductive-- conclusions as certain as the premises

> (2) inductive-- uses deduction but conclusion only probable

"A deductive inference, if it is logically correct, gives as much certainty to the conclusion as the premises, while an inductive infrence, even when it obeys all the rules of logic, only makes the conclusion probable even when the premises are deemed certain" (The Art of Philosophizing, p. 38)

> Induction is "immensely strenghten[ed]" by "general laws" [he means, e.g. mathematical formulas in his sense of p. 57] which can show "the presence of regularity"(p. 50).

> He makes a bold assertion that:

"...general laws cannot be discovered unless they exist."(p. 51)

> That induction is "valid" cannot be proved by induction [reference?]. At the end of the essay he throws up his hands and invokes Reichenbach (!)

."..roughly speaking, his answer is this: If induction is valid, science is possible; if it is not, science is impossible, since there is no other imaginable principle to take its place. Therefore you will do well to act on the assumption that induction is valid, since, otherwise, you can have no reason for doing one thing rather than another. This answer is not fallactious, but I cannot say that I find it very satisfying" (The Art..., p. 75)

Russell avows the existence of "universals" and their existence beyond our minds:

"Having now seen that there must be such entitites as universals, the next point to be proved is that their being is not merely mental. By this is meant that wheatever being belongs to them is independent of their being though of or in any way apprehended by minds." (p. 97)

In the two paragraphs just prior he states his oppostion to Berkeley and Hume's denial of "universals" (universal laws, universal qualities such as "whiteness"). In particular he casserts: "The relation of resemblance, therefore, must be a true universal".:

"Berkeley and Hume failed to perceive this refutation of their rejection of 'abstracct ideas', because, like their adversaires, they only thought of qualities, and altogether ignored relations, as universals" (p. 97)

He goes on to assert that

Every thing that can be apprehended by the senses or by introspection exists at some particular time" (p. 98)

whereas relations such as (his example) 'north of' (as in: "Edinburgh is nort of London" is "...neither in space nor in time, neither material nor mental; yet is something." (p. 98)

Russell eventually asserts that certain "relations" between [sensations? what exactly?]such as "similar to" ("same as"), "above", "below", etc. are "a priori". Because of philosophic abuses he moves away from [eschews, wishes to avoid] the word "innate" but does derive "a priori" from "innate". And "universal" seems to mean "always" or "always within reason" when applied to multiple observations [true?? Verify.]] Thus:

"Edinburgh is above London."

could be interpreted to mean:

"Edinburgh and London exist and always it is true that: 'Edingburgh is north of London'."

The reader may develop certain anxieties around this example: They may start with "What does "north" mean? The statement implies the existance of a "South Pole" and "true" measurements that indicate Edinburgh "is farther from of the South Pole than London", and the premise that, For all X and Y, "If X is "farther from of South Pole than Y" then "X is north of Y", but the reader will can troubles if one were to go the wrong way over the North Pole, etc. etc. wvbaileyWvbailey 21:20, 8 March 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Anarchist law

Anarchist law should be merged here because it's the only form of law compatible with anarchism. Anarchism necessarily rejects positive law because positive law is the construction of a government. Anarchism rejects government and any authority with the capacity to create formal law. When anarchists talk about law in anarchy, they appear universally to mean natural law. Sarge Baldy 00:11, 16 April 2006 (UTC)

why have Anarchist law then, when Natural law already exists? Why pick different terms for concepts that have existed already for centuries on end? Intangible 02:49, 21 April 2006 (UTC)

it would be inappropriate to merge Anarchist Law with Natural Law. The Natural Law page is bad enough already without being made more confusing by including Anarchy. The concepts are distinct. It may be appropriate for the Anarchist Law page to refer to Natural Law but it would not be especially appropriate for the Natural Law page to include a section on Anarchist Law, whatever that might mean.

[edit] Merge

This page should not be merged with natural law because while natural law is a broad and extensive topic in many disciplines, this page only discusses the concept of "law of nature" as it applies to Hobbes' political theory. Instead, this page should be titled something like "Law of Nature (Hobbesian)" as opposed to "Law of Nature (percept)." Zschaps 18:36, 26 April 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Teleological?

This theory is NOT Teleological. Teleological ethical theories are concerned with concequences, Natural Law is not.--Tellebug 14:54, 31 May 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Alternate spellings

Should not Ius naturale redirect here? 131.111.8.96 08:14, 10 October 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Daoism?

I think Daoism should be mentioned somewhere on this page. The base idea of the Dao is that there is universal, not written laws, which seems to fit well withen the ideas of natural law.