Godbout v. Longueuil (City)

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Godbout v. Longueuil (City)

Hearing: May 28, 1997
Judgment: October 31, 1997


Full case name:	City of Longueuil v. Michèle Godbout
Citations:	[1997] 3 S.C.R. 844
Ruling:	For Godbout. Appeal and cross-appeal dismissed.

Court membership

Chief Justice: Antonio Lamer
Puisne Justices: Gérard La Forest, Claire L'Heureux-Dubé, John Sopinka, Charles Gonthier, Peter Cory, Beverley McLachlin, Frank Iacobucci, John C. Major

Case opinions

Majority by: La Forest J.
Joined by: L’Heureux-Dubé and McLachlin JJ.
Concurrence by: Major J.
Joined by: Lamer C.J. and Sopinka J.
Concurrence by: Cory J.
Joined by: Gonthier and Iacobucci J.

Laws applied

Section 7 of the Charter;Brasserie Labatt ltée v. Villa, [1995] R.J.Q. 73

Godbout v. Longueuil (City), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 844 is a leading Supreme Court of Canada decision where the Court found that the city of Longueuil that required all permanent employees to reside within the municipality was in violation of the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

[edit] Background

Michèle Godbout was hired as a dispatcher for the Longueuil police force. As part of his employment he was required to sign a declaration that he would reside within the city and if he were to move outside of the city he would be terminated without notice. Initially he had lived within the city but soon bought a house in a nearby community. When he refused to move back in he was fired.

[edit] Opinion of the Court

Justice La Forest, writing for the Court, held that the restriction on residency was unconstitutional.

La Forest began by considering the question of whether the Canadian Charter applied to municipalities. He found that it did as they were government entities. He noted that municipalities were run by elected officials and were accountable to the public, they had the power to collect taxes, and they had the power to make laws which they derived from the provincial government.

La Forest considered the validity of the law under section 7 of the Canadian Charter. He identified section 7 as protecting personal autonomy which includes the choice of selecting one's home. At no time did Godbout waive that right, even in signing the employment contract that contained the residency restrction. He further found that the restriction did not conform to the principles of fundamental justice as there was no compelling reason to have such a restiction.

Finally, La Forest found that the selection of a places of residence was within the meaning of "private life" which is protected under section 5 of the Quebec Charter.