European defence procurement
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Modern European defence procurement is making a move from a traditional, postwar, United States/NATO-sponsored effort towards a more independent and competitive capability. The European Defence Agency has been set up in 2001 to create such a stronger European market for defence equipment.
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[edit] History
The Eurofighter Typhoon is an example of European commitment to its own industry. When the British government cancelled the TSR-2 and purchased the F-4 Phantom II there was outcry. In the 1970s and 1980s when selecting the next generation fighter the government recognised that to repeat such a move was politically unacceptable, strengthening the case for a next generation European fighter. Previously United Kingdom, Germany and Italy had cooperated in producing the Panavia Tornado in the 1970s.
[edit] Industry
While European defence budgets remain fragmented and massive duplication in research and development exists, the European defence industry has begun to consolidate. British Aerospace was widely expected to merge with Germany’s DASA to form the first major European defence giant. Instead in 1999 BAe merged with another British company, GEC's defence businesses (GEC-Marconi), to form BAE Systems. As a result, in 2000, DASA merged with Aerospatiale-Matra to form EADS. Further consolidation of the smaller defence firms cannot be ruled out.
In 2002 the formation of MBDA brought together the product portfolios of Aerospatiale Matra Missiles (of EADS), Alenia Marconi Systems missiles, and Matra BAe Dynamics to form Europe's No. 1 missile manufacturer and No. 2 globally after Raytheon.
Other major players include
- AgustaWestland
- Dassault Aviation
- Eurocopter
- Eurofighter International
- Rolls-Royce
- Snecma
- Thales
- Finmeccanica
[edit] Products
Below are some examples of European products and the previously dominant U.S. developed weapons they may replace.
- A400M – replacing C-130 and Franco/German Transall
- Meteor – replacing AMRAAM as long-range AAM
- ASRAAM and IRIS-T – replacing Sidewinder as short-range AAM
- Eurofighter Typhoon – replacing F-4 Phantom II, F-16s, sepecat jaguars, Tornado F.3
- EH101 – largely replacing European helicopters
- NH90 – largely replacing European helicopters
- PzH 2000 – replacing M109 Paladin
- Horizon class frigate and FREMM multipurpose frigate both for the French and Italian navies
Examples of products which one country continues to pursue alone (national products) are those for which collaboration would be unacceptable or undesirable for that nation. For example the UK chose to continue the collaboration for its strategic deterrent with the United States for its Vanguard class Trident submarines. This relationship has allowed the UK to maintain a credible nuclear capability at a lower cost than that of France's independent deterrent. Likewise France's desire for military and industrial independence has motivated its continued pursuit of high-technology projects, e.g. Dassault Rafale. There are some exceptions to this rule, for example while the UK failed to continue its collaboration with France and Italy on the Horizon CNGF and started its national Type 45, the destroyers will share the same weapons systems, primarily the MBDA Aster.
The commitment of European governments to European industry is demonstrated by two recent product selections, the decision over Meteor and the progression of the A400M airlifter. British Prime Minister Tony Blair came under immense pressure from President Bill Clinton to select Raytheon's future missile to arm the Eurofighter, however the UK government selected the European missile. The Meteor could be deemed riskier, however the Meteor armed Typhoon will not be subject to U.S. export controls and MBDA now has a missile product with no real competition from American manufacturers. Likewise European governments were actively dissuaded by the US Department of Defense from continuing the A400M project, the Pentagon argued that the Lockheed C-130J and Boeing C-17 provided all the capability European governments need. They also argued that to spend limited budgetary resources on such duplication was foolish.
Current American fighters have fewer export prospects in Europe than a generation before. The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter will probably not see the level of support for the previous generation F-16. However this may have more to do with the nature of the JSF contract than any shift in European policy as the JSF project will not allow final assembly in other countries as was widespread with the F-16. There is a case being made for another final assembly line outside the USA and the UK is making a strong pitch for it to be situated there, but this is due to the UK's "Level 1" status and commitment to the F-35.
[edit] Conclusion
It can be argued that the focus on "buying European" sometimes obscures the important factor, the actual provision of capability. Only the UK operates a truly competitive defence procurement policy, for example allowing the involvement of the Thales Group in the Royal Navy Future Carrier (CVF). Other European governments continue to support "national champions," awarding contracts not on a best cost basis but rather to guarantee their own defence industry. BAE's arguments for such treatment from the Ministry of Defence have been ignored.
Recent UK government selection of European defence equipment has been more related to capability than such a "buy European" policy. The UK's Meteor decision was not dogmatic, but represented a true increase in both the operational capability of the Eurofighter and potential for export sales than an AMRAAM equipped Typhoon.
It seems likely that a stronger, more competitive and potentially more efficient European industry will allow European governments to do more with current budgets. However American companies are assured of a healthy share of European procurement budgets. The UK continues to order U.S. defence products in large numbers, JSF, Chinook, C-130J are a few examples. The F-35 is also likely to see service in other European air forces, but probably not to the extent of the F-16.
A problem for the European Defence Cooperation however, is that France - which has a large defence industry - sometimes chooses own projects instead of participating in European ones. France withdrew from both the Panavia Tornado (in 1967), and the Eurofighter Typhoon (in 1985) projects in favour of French projects.
