Epistemic virtue
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The epistemic virtues, as identified by virtue epistemologists, reflect their contention that belief is an ethical process, and thus susceptible to the intellectual virtue or vice of one's thought life. Epistemology is the branch of philosophy concerned with the question "How do we know?" Some epistemic virtues have been identified by W. Jay Wood, based on research into the medieval tradition. The list below[citation needed] substantially overlaps with his.
- attentiveness
- circumspection
- coachability
- creativity
- curiosity
- discernment
- discretion
- foresight
- intellectual honesty
- intellectual humility
- imaginativeness
- interpretive sensitivity
- objectivity
- perceptiveness
- prudence/practical wisdom
- studiousness
- tenacity
- truthfulness
- understanding
- wisdom
- warrant
Note that in this context curiosity bears the modern connotation of inquisitiveness, in contrast to the medieval connotation of attraction to unwholesome things.
These can be contrasted to the epistemic vices such as:
- close-mindedness
- curiosity [see below]
- intellectual dishonesty
- dogmatism
- epistemic blindness
- folly
- gullibility
- obtuseness
- self-deception
- superficiality of thought
- superstition
- willful naïveté
- wishful thinking
Note that in this context curiosity bears the medieval connotation of attraction to unwholesome things, in contrast to the positive studious (or perhaps inquisitive).
[edit] See also
[edit] External links
- Virtue Epistemology by John Greco
- The Crisis in Contemporary Epistemology by W. Jay Wood
- Is Inclusion an Epistemic Virtue? by Harvey Siegel
- Review of James Montmarquet's Epistemic Virtue and Doxastic Responsibility by Jonathan L. Kvanvig
