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Drug court

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Drug courts are specialized courts designed to handle cases involving offenders who abuse addictive substances. The judiciary, prosecution, defense bar, probation, law enforcement, mental health, social service, and treatment communities work together to break the cycle of addiction.

Drug courts offer offenders charged with less-serious crimes of being under the influence, possession of a controlled substance, or even drug using offenders charged with a non-drug related crime the option of entering the drug court system in lieu of serving a jail sentence. Offenders will have to plead guilty to the charge, agree to take part in treatment, regular drug screenings, and regular reporting to the drug court judge for a minimum of one year. Should the offender fail to comply with one or more of the requirements they may be removed from the drug court and incarcerated at the judge's discretion. If they complete the drug court program the charges brought against them are dropped.

Contents

[edit] Drug courts in the United States

The first drug court in the U.S. took shape in Miami-Dade County, Florida in 1989 as a response to the growing crack-cocaine problem plaguing the city. Chief Judge Gerald Wetherington, Judge Herbert Klein, then State Attorney Janet Reno and Public Defender Bennett Brummer designed the court for nonviolent offenders to receive treatment. This model of court system quickly became a popular method for dealing with the ever increasing number of drug offenders. Between 1984 and 1999, the number of defendants charged with a drug offense in the Federal courts increased 247%, from 11,854 to 29,306. By 1999 there were 472 drug courts in the nation and by 2005 that number had increased to 1262 with another 575 drug courts in the planning stages; currently all 50 states have working drug courts.

[edit] Screening process

Most drug courts do not accept all offenders of drug related crime, often choosing to rule out violent offenders and those that sell drugs. Some courts choose to screen out offenders that are considered a risk. Some courts prefer offenders who have gone through treatment previously while others prefer the opposite. In the first 4 years of the Miami drug court, roughly 20% of all offenders of drug related crimes were accepted into the court.

[edit] The judge’s role

The judge provides the structure by which to live and enforces the rules of the program and uses incentives to encourage offenders to remain in the program and on the right track. One tool the judge has available is the drug screen, a process that checks offenders for recent drug use. Judges often have discretion as to how frequently an offender is checked. It is important that a judge check often enough to discourage drug use while not so often as to alienate an offender’s trust. The judge also has the option to punish or be lenient with an offender that has strayed from the program or broken the rules. Usual punishments include jail time or the expulsion from the drug court program.

[edit] Treatment centers

Treatment centers are responsible for the actual curing of the addiction and there exists a fundamental relationship between their success and the success of the offenders. Communities often experience difficulty properly funding treatment centers and often rely on existing treatment centers to donate facility and employee time to aid the court. Drug courts can affect a treatment center’s ability to effectively treat offenders due to an overwhelming increase in the number of patients. Success of a treatment center also depends on the methods of treatment used and level of employee training. A good scenario for drug courts is for all treatment centers that specialize in a single drug or patient type to be available to the drug court for use.

[edit] Incentives for success

The factors that keep a drug offender within the drug court system vary between courts, but common incentives include increased jail time for failure, the promise of charges being dropped for success, and the support of the treatment centers. Offenders who lie to judges or suffer from a relapse are often given a week in jail or, if the behavior continues, can be removed from the program all together, often resulting in stiff jail time sentences. Positive incentives can include high school equivalency or GED programs, vocational training, and a graduation ceremony with a certificate of completion. Often programs are designed to involve multiple stages, which reward offenders with increased freedom as they reach each stage. Drug courts may also have alumni programs for those who have successfully completed the program. This allows graduates to give back to the community, aid the drug court, and help current offenders.

[edit] Recidivism rates

Recidivism rates for offenders who have graduated from drug courts are generally considerably better than recidivism rates of offenders who did not partake in a drug court program. The average recidivism rate for those who complete the drug court program is between 4% and 29% as compared to 48% for those who do not participate in a drug court program. A 2003 recidivism report by the Urban Institute and Caliber Associates, entitled, "Recidivism Rates For Drug Court Graduates: National Based Estimates," representative of over 17,000 annual drug court graduates nationwide, found that recidivism rates for drug court participants one year after graduation is a mere 16.5% and only 27.5% after two years. However, the report acknowledges that these numbers may underestimate the actual recidivism rates as they are based on FBI statistical information that may not included arrests that states did not report to the FBI.

In 2003 the Center for Court Innovation released a report that analyzed the impact of the New York State drug court system. The study found that the re-conviction rate among 2,135 defendants who participated in six of the state’s drug courts was, on average, 29 percent lower (13% to 47%) over three years than the for the same types of offenders who did not enter the drug court. Many local studies have found similar recidivism rates.

[edit] Cost benefit

In 1999 the average annual cost of housing someone convicted of a drug related crime in prison was $64,157, while the annual cost per offender in a drug court system averaged $3000. A 1998 study in Utah estimates state costs of incarcerating one individual for a year at $18,250 while the drug court annual cost was $2555. Other studies estimate the cost of annual incarceration to be anywhere from $9,224, reported in a 2004 Nebraska study, to $21,000 as reported by the Oregon Judicial Department. In a 2003 study New York State estimates that $254 million in incarceration costs were saved by diverting 18,000 non-violent drug offenders into state drug courts, and two 2002 studies in California estimate the state saves $18 million per year through their drug courts.

[edit] NADCP

The National Association of Drug Court Professionals sponsors training programs nationwide to promote drug court effectiveness.

[edit] Criticisms

Drug Courts are still considered a relatively young judicial implement and many elements of the drug court system are prone to criticism.

The screening process often makes judging the success of a drug court difficult since it has such a large effect on the courts overall success. A court that accepts fewer offenders will have a higher graduation rate and a lower recidivism rate than a court that is less stringent. The fact that a drug court can increase its success by denying offenders treatment would suggest that courts might raise their standards, thereby lowering their overall effectiveness, in order to show a higher success rate.

Critics also often question the recidivism rates that courts report since most studies compare recidivism rates of those who have successfully graduated from drug court to those who did not partake in drug court. Many argue that studies should also include offenders who failed to graduate from drug court, and make comparisons of successful graduates to offenders with similar backgrounds, i.e. recidivism rates for those addicted to cocaine should not be compared to those who were arrested for use of marijuana, and recidivism rates for offenders who have used drugs for under 5 years should not be compared to offenders who have been using for 10 or more years. Ethnic, economic, and sociological considerations should also be considered.

Some argue that the cost benefit is also misrepresented, often reported as an annual cost comparison as opposed to an actual cost comparison. The average retention rate, the number of offenders who successfully graduate from drug court nationally, is 60%. Cost analysis rarely studies what happens to the other 40% and the resulted increased cost to the community. Those that fail to complete a drug court program are often given a second chance, resulting in another year of treatment, while others are sent to prison to serve out a sentence. 40% of drug court participants end up costing the community more than the reported 1-year drug court cost.

Furthermore, involvement in a drug court program often exceeds one year while prison sentences for non-violent misdemeanor offenders is often less than 1 full year; in fact federal sentencing policy states that simple possession of any quantity of any substance, other than crack cocaine, by a first-time offender -including powder cocaine- is a misdemeanor offense punishable by a maximum of one year in prison, and due to the screening process the majority of drug court participants tend to be misdemeanor offenders.

There is no national standard for drug court structure, which leaves comparison between courts difficult to judge. Some argue that until a national standard is devised it would be almost impossible to determine how successful a drug court is at reducing drug use within a community. Until drug courts establish performance benchmarks, determine the best practices for drug court programs, and develop standards and accreditation procedures that can be used to determine whether a particular drug court is meeting the standards set forth, criticisms such as these will continue.

[edit] Additional Reading

  • Clayton, Robert M. (1999). Missouri's Experience with Drug Courts. Spectrum, 72, 30-32.
  • Craddock, Amy. Rochester City Drug Treatment Court. (1999). Rochester Drug Treatment Court Participation Characteristics 1995-1998. Rochester.
  • Finn, Peter, and Andrea K. Newlyn. National Institue of Justice. (1993). Miami's "Drug Court" A Different Approach. Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice.
  • Goldkamp, John S., and Doris Weiland. National Institute of Justice. (1993). Assessing the Impact of Dade County's Felony Drug Court. Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice.
  • Huddleston, C. West (1998). Drug Courts and Jail-Based Treatment. Corrections Today, 60. 98-101.
  • Kaye (1999). Making the Case for Hands-On Courts. Newsweek, 134, 11.
  • Mountjoy, John J. (1999). Drug Courts: Making Prison Sentences a Thing of the Past? Spectrum, 72, 2-4.

This report synthesizes the following research:

Anspach, Donald F., and Andrew S. Ferguson. “Assessing the Efficacy of Treatment Modalities in the Context of Adult Drug Courts, Final Report.” Grant No. 2000–DC–VX–0008.

Butts, Jeffrey A., and John Roman, eds. Juvenile Drug Courts and Teen Substance Abuse. Washington, DC: The Urban Institute Press, 2004. (Based on research conducted under Grant No. 2000–DC–VX–K003).

Carey, Shannon M., and Michael W. Finigan. “Detailed Cost Analysis in a Mature Drug Court Setting: A Cost Benefit Evaluation of the Multnomah County Drug Court.” Grant No. 2000–DC–VX–K004.

Finigan, Michael W., and Shannon M. Carey. ”Analysis of 26 Drug Courts: Lessons Learned, Final Report.” (Commissioned paper, 2002).

Goldkamp, John S., Michael D. White, and Jennifer B. Robinson. “From Whether to How Drug Courts Work: Retrospective Evaluation of Two Pioneering Drug Courts in Clark County (Las Vegas) and Multnomah County (Portland), Phase II Report from the National Evaluation of Drug Courts.” Grant No. 98–DC–VX–K001.

  • Roman, John, Wendy Townsend and Avinash Singh Bhati. (2003). Recidivism Rates for Drug Court Graduates: Nationally Based Estimates, Final Report. NCJ 201229.

[edit] External links

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