Anjala conspiracy
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The Anjala conspiracy of 1788 was a scheme by disgruntled Swedish officers to end Gustav III's Russian War of 1788–90. Declaring Finland an independent state was part of the plot, although it's disputed what importance the conspirators connected to that aspect.
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[edit] Rising anger against the king and his war
As the war was badly prepared and without the expected initial success, anger rose against the king within the military ranks deployed to Finland, where the memory of the harsh Russian occupations of 1713–21 (the "Greater Wrath") and 1741–43 (the "Lesser Wrath") remained vivid. The war was clearly initiated by Sweden, and in the view of a strong opinion, particularly among noble officers, a clear violation of the authoritarian Instrument of Government that the king with support of the common estates of the parliament had imposed in 1772.
It was no secret that the war was conceived to increase the king's popularity and influence, and diminish that of his, mostly noble, opponents. The anger was fueled also by Cabinet members who felt duped to support the war plans by the king's selective quoting of diplomatic reports from Saint Petersburg. The failed attempts to besiege and reconquer Hamina and Savonlinna, since 1743 in Russian hands, ultimately ignited a vehement opposition among the officers, and it was said that even the king wished for peace.
[edit] A peace feeler bypassing the king
The leaders of the Anjala conspiracy entered secretly in communication with the Tsarina Catherine the Great. Johan Anders Jägerhorn delivered the Liikkala note dated August 8, 1788 to the empress. The letter note was signed by several officers, including Armfelt, Commander-in-Chief for the eastern forces and the king's closest confidant. The officers declared the war to be illegal, asked for the restoration of the Finnish borders according to the Treaty of Nystad of 1721, and for peace negotiations with representatives of the Finnish nation, which they understood as (the ethnically Swedish) representatives for the eastern and northern half of Sweden, which during the 18th century twice had been harshly occupied, and whose peasant population overwhelmingly were ethnic Finns.
On August 13, a supportive declaration was signed by 113 officers in Anjala, and sent to the king, according to which they declared that they would continue their defence of the fatherland in case Catherine refused the peace offer. An important demand was that the diet must be summoned in the critical situation. The declaration won increasing respect within the army and navy.
[edit] Results
The support would however diminish when it became obvious that the Russian government aimed to use the declaration to divide Sweden proper. From the Swedish government's point of view, this was an act of high treason that put the state's integrity in dire danger.
Gustav III perceived his most bitter opponents to have become leaders of the Anjala-men, and feared for his life if remaining in Finland. Commencing a new theatre of war against Denmark in the South, the king had a good excuse to leave for less dangerous surroundings. Soon, however, he found the public opinion on his side, and the leading conspirators were arrested during the winter. Two of the conspirators ended up as refugees in Russia, nine were sentenced to death, although only one was executed while the rest were either deported or put in prison.
The idea of a separate Finnish nation would be echoed by Alexander I at the Diet of Porvoo, when he of the eastern part of Sweden actually created the semi-independent Grand Duchy of Finland in personal union with Imperial Russia.
[edit] Long-term effects
It may be argued, that king Gustav used the Anjala conspiracy to win support for a revision of the Swedish Constitution in order to strengthen his own position and weaken the influence of his opponents. But it may also be argued that this was what he had aimed at with the war itself; and that he even after the unsuccessful attack on Russia might have been fully capable to achieve this, also without the public opinion boost the Anjala conspiracy offered. A conclusion might be that the conspiracy maybe is more significant as an indicator of the situation in Sweden of the late 18th century, than as an actual agent in history.
The military officers, who had supported the events with the best intentions for their country, became further alienated by the condemnations from government and public opinion. Hence it can be argued that the split between the state leadership and the leading nobles (civil servants and officers), particularly in Finland, was further aggravated due to the reaction on the Anjala affair, also if the government's reaction for exactly that reason was intentionally lenient. This increased the willingness of leading Swedes in Finland to switch allegiance from Stockholm to Saint Petersburg, and contributed thus to the split of Sweden in 1808/09.
The common estates', and the public opinion's, critical assessment of the Anjala-men were in many circles in Finland seen as yet another sign of a rift between the two parts of Sweden. It seemed as if the Age of Liberty had elevated people with a very narrow view of the world, a view that obviously did not reach to the realm's eastern periphery. In other words, which would be echoed also in connection with Finland's 20th century wars, it seemed as if the majority of the Swedes did no longer consider the Finns' interests, nor appreciate the importance of the eastern provinces for Sweden, nor the Finns' sacrifices.
However, it ought not to be neglected, that the conspiracy also further emboldened the Russians, who for all of the century had successfully strived for influence over Sweden's domestic and foreign politics, and now saw the increasing possibility to acquire all of Sweden's eastern provinces, which would mean a substantial improvement of the strategic position of the new Russian capital, Saint Petersburg, at the Gulf of Finland.
[edit] History views in Finland and Sweden
Unsurprisingly, the evaluation of the Anjala conspiracy differs somewhat between Sweden and Finland.
In Finland, it's often seen as an important phase of nation building, and the separatist aspect is maybe somewhat inflated, putting the conspirators' primary strife for peace and restored political liberties in the background.
In Sweden, the conspiracy is typically either seen as an understandable opposition against an oppressive king, that actually would be assassinated in 1792, and whose son, Gustav IV Adolf, would be deposed in 1809, or alternatively as an omen of how treacherous Swedish civil servants in 1808/09 would facilitate Russia's acquisition of the eastern half of Sweden.
