Waiting period (Six-Day War)

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The waiting period (Hebrew: תקופת ההמתנה Tkufat HaHamtana) was the period which began in the Israeli Independence day of the Hebrew year of 5727, which was in May 15, 1967, with the crossing of the Suez canal and entering to the spaces of the Sinai peninsula by Egyptian ground forces, after the Soviet Union requested that Egypt do so. That was after the Soviet Union gave to Egypt false information according to which Israel is assembling forces in the north in order to invade Syria. Israel invite delegates from the Soviet embassy to tour in the northern border and to see the truth, but they refused. The waiting period ended in the beginning of the Six-Day War. Many estimate that the crisis began without there will be an intention at any of the sides to bring to comprehensive war, but series of steps that couldn't be predicted brought the area to the war.

Contents 1 Military moves 2 Political moves 2.1 The establishing of the national unity government 3 See also

[edit] Military moves

In May 17 the president of Egypt demanded from the commander of the United Nations emergency force in Sinai and in the Gaza Strip that his forces will leave the border line and will concentrate in their camps. The United Nations forces waited to an order from the United Nations secretary and Nasser turned to the United Nations secretary in request that he will order on complete evacuation of the emergency force of the United Nations from the land of Egypt. In May 22 president Nasser's demand was agreed by the United Nations, and then he declared that in the following day the Straits of Tiran will be closed to Israeli seacrafts, and that he is ready to war against Israel.

In May 23 Egypt closed the Straits of Tiran to passage of Israeli ships. The closing of the Straits of Tiran was a Casus belli. Nasser's act received great sympathy in the Arab world. In the Arab states started mass demonstrations which called to war against Israel and to its extermination.

In the second half of May 1967 the Egyptian forces in Sinai were about 130,000 soldiers in seven divisions, part of them are armored.

In the end of May and in the first days of June 1967 agreements for military cooperation were signed between Egypt to Jordan, Syria and Iraq, and an Egyptian general was appointed to the commander of the eastern front.

Despite the will of King Hussein of Jordan not to be dragged to war, Jordan and Egypt signed on military treaty. Several days afterward, the Jordanian forces were under the command of the Egyptian general. Israel called to Jordan not to be dragged to a confrontation and the King Hussein stood in a difficult dilemma: from one side, if he will be dragged to war Jordan could get painful hit from Israel, but from the other side if he will not be dragged to war there will be danger to rebellion.

It had been created a real threat of invasion to Israel from the east. Israel worried that Jordanian forces that were in the West Bank, only 17 kilometers from the Israeli coast, will dissect Israel to two parts, In two days, from May 19 onward, the reserve force of the State of Israel was drafted and puted in state of alertness. A waiting period started, in which the Israeli economy was paralyzed due to the staying of all the fit mans in reserve service, and existential anxiety was on Israel. The Israeli public didn't felt confidence in the Prime Minister of Israel Levi Eshkol. As the waiting period continued, and Eshkol didn't ordered on going to war, the fear that the Arab states will precede the State of Israel and will attack first became stronger.

[edit] Political moves

The waiting period was a period of great anxiety in the Israeli public from the approaching war. Leaders, including David Ben-Gurion, accused the chief of general staff Yitzhak Rabin in serious accusations on that that he is dragging the IDF to war. The National Religious Party leader Khayim Moshe Shapira said to Rabin: "how you dare to go to war when all the conditions are to the bad of us?". The head of the Operations Branch at GHQ Ezer Weizman told that Rabin called him to his house in May 23, 1967, there he said to him: "I complicated the State of Israel because of series of mistakes that I did... I believe that who that mistaked must go. I mistaked. Will you accept on you the job of the Chief of Staff?". Weizman refused to the offer in claim that this will bring to demoralization in the IDF, and suggested Rabin to rest. In the end of this day Rabin felt severe fatigue. A doctor gave him a relieving injection which puted him to sleep until the afternoon of the day after. In the two days after Weizman commanded on the army in fact, and take out orders to the commanders of the army to the summary of the final preparations to the war. The Prime Minister Eshkol approved in retrospect these orders which was given without the approval of the Chief of Staff. Weizman spread that the Chief of Staff had a "nicotine poisoning". In May 25, 1967 Rabin returned to full function. This event was hidden from the public in many years, but strengthened the discomfiture in the political system.

On the other hand, in the highlight of the waiting period, the government and Levi Eshkol in its head considered as behaving in hesitancy in the issue of if go out to prevention offensive facing the overcoming threat when all the hopes will be lost. Started pressures on Eshkol to agree to the joining of the Rafi people to the government, and to the appointing of Moshe Dayan to the security minister. Eshkol did not agree to the returning of his rivals from Rafi to the government, and saw in the demand that he will give the security portfolio to another kind of subversion under his authorities. Eshkol tried to use all the options to international mediation that will end the crisis. The foreign minister Abba Eban was in the United States, and tried to bring to an action of the American government. The international crisis went and worsened. In a meeting in 2 A.M. in May 27 the Soviet ambassador gave to Eshkol a strong message from the Soviet Premier Alexey Kosygin who warned from military action. In the noon of this day this kind of message received from Eshkol's friend, the President of the United States Lyndon B. Johnson. In the voting that was held in the government in the night hours, the opinions about the going to war were contrary. Nine ministers supported in immediate going to war, and nine supported in waiting. Eshkol did not succeed to determine between the camps, and in typical mode he postpone the continuation of the discussion to another day.

To the strengthening of the public's spirit contributed a crucial contribution Chaim Herzog, who in the year of 1962 retired from the IDF in the high rank of Aluf, in daily commentaries that he gave in Kol Yisrael.

[edit] The establishing of the national unity government

In the same evening, the May 28, 1967, Eshkol gave a radio address to the nation. During the preparation of the speech some versions were created, after Eshkol did to the printed speech a quick proofreading. The speech broadcasted in live broadcast. When Eshkol arrived to the paragraph, in which correction was made, and the section "likewise were determined action lines to the moving of the forces" was changed to the section "likewise were determined action lines to the withdrawing of the forces" he started to hesitate, he did not understand the correction that was done, and in live broadcast he started to stutter to the microphone. This action created the impression in the eyes of the public that in the head of the government is sitting a hesitant and stutterer man, who doesn't capable to determine, and that the country is in great danger. This address is known as the "stuttered address".

From the radio studios Eshkol came to the meeting of the IDF General Staff. The mood in the General Staff was stormy, and they were, like Ariel Sharon, who talked about the replacing of Eshkol in force. The generals Ariel Sharon, Ezer Weizman, Avraham Yaffe and the Chief of Staff said hard words in Eshkol's face. Eshkol left the meeting in anger. In the same day Jordan announced on her joining to the alliance with Syria and Egypt.

In May 29 "HaArets" newspaper wrote in the main editorial that "Mr. Eshkol is not built to be the prime minister and the security minister in the current situation". Eshkol speeched in the Knesset and tried to calm the public that "it is reasonable to expect that the states that support in the principle of the freedom of sailing, will do and will coordinate an efficient action in order to ensure that the straits and the bay will be open to the passage of the ships of all the nations without discrimination". But the internal pressure continued. In June 1 Eshkol didn't saw a choice, and gave the security portfolio to Moshe Dayan. Also were joined to the government Gahal representatives Menachem Begin and Yosef Sapir, and were appointed to ministers without portfolio. It was the first unity government that was established in the State of Israel, and in this time was called Memshelet Likud Leumi. With the appointing of Dayan to the security minister, Eshkol lost the leadership, and in fact gave to Dayan the ruling on the going to war and on its course.

In the beginning of June it had been turn out that the political activity to the prevention of the war was failed and that there is no refuge from military action. In June 3 the Americans expressed acquiescence to action against Egypt.

[edit] See also

• Background to Six-Day War
• Six-Day War